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THE COURTS UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA
ScoTT A. MOSS'
President Obama's plans for the economy and the military get more
headlines, but his most lasting power could be shaping the next several
decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence on abortion rights, discrimina-
tion laws, presidential power, church-state separation, and other issues.
President Obama's ability to shape all other federal courts may be no less
important, given that the thirteen federal courts of appeals and ninety-
three federal district courts already, at the start of his term, have fifty-
four judicial vacancies' that President Obama and the heavily Democrat-
ic Senate could, if they choose, largely fill in 2009-2010.
This short Essay discusses what can be predicted now, as President
Obama begins his term, about the impact on the federal courts of the
Obama presidency. The Essay first discusses the vacancies likely to
arise on the Supreme Court in the eight-year window (2009-2017) that
will be either President Obama's eight years in office or President Ob-
ama's four years followed by four years of another President, presuma-
bly the 2012 Republican nominee. The Essay then discusses what issue
outcomes will change after four years of President Obama nominating
justices and judges, and then after four more years of either President
Obama or a Republican President following him; the issue areas dis-
cussed are abortion, the Establishment Clause, affirmative action and
school desegregation, limits on federal employment and abortion laws
under the Interstate Commerce power, and presidential power. Finally,
this Essay discusses in a more limited fashion-because less can be pre-
dicted-the impact of the Obama presidency on the federal district and
appellate courts.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S COMPOSITION AND RETIREMENTS
A. The Current Composition: An Old Court
With only two new Justices appointed from 1995 to 2008, this is
getting to be an old Supreme Court, one likely to see a number of Justic-
es depart, and be replaced, in the next several years. Here is a list of the
current Justices and their ages at the end of the first term, and possible
second term, of the next President:
t Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School (scott.moss@colorado.edu).
1. See Federal Judicial Vacancies, http://tinyurl.com/amuzqf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). Of
local interest, there are three judicial vacancies within the Tenth Circuit, two for District Judges in
the District of Colorado and one for a District Judge in the District of Wyoming.
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Justice Age at end of 1 st term Age at end of 2nd term
John Paul Stevens 92 97
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 79 83
Anthony Kennedy 76 80
Antonin Scalia 76 80
Stephen Breyer 74 78
David Souter 73 77
Clarence Thomas 64 68
Samuel Alito 62 66
John Roberts 57 61
With six Justices already well into their 70s now, it seems likely
that the next President will get to appoint at least two new Justices in a
first term alone, possibly five or six in a second term. No recent Presi-
dent has had such an opportunity; President Nixon appointed four Justic-
es in his five years, but the six Presidents since then have combined to
appoint only ten Justices over thirty-five years:
President Years Justices Appointed
George W. Bush 8 2 (Roberts & Alito)
Bill Clinton 8 2 (Ginsburg & Breyer)
George H.W. Bush 4 2 (Souter & Thomas)
Ronald Reagan 8 3 (O'Connor, Scalia, & Kennedy)
Jimmy Carter 4 0
Gerald Ford 3 1 (Stevens)
Richard Nixon 5 4 (Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Powell)
B. Predicting Upcoming Court Vacancies
We can have fun with the "name game"-whom might President
Obama appoint?-but it really is impossible to predict individual ap-
pointments in advance.2 A more meaningful game is to make predictions
on issues, not names: What individual rights and government powers
likely will change the most after President Obama gets to name a few
2. Who anticipated President Bush's nonination of Harriet Miers? Even President Clinton's
two fairly uncontroversial choices (Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, both federal appellate judges for
over a decade who received overwhelming Senate support) were unpredictable in their own way,
well-documented to have come after multiple twists and turns, with several other quite different
individuals having been leading candidates, even possibly offered the job (i.e., Mario Cuomo), or at
least preferred choices until being disqualified upon a review of medical records (i.e., Richard Ar-
nold) before the ultimate choices of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.
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Justices to cast votes on the Supreme Court? For this "Predict the Court"
game, I use the following rules (not "rules" so much as reasonable as-
sumptions that I cannot defend as certain to play out exactly this way):
(1) President Obama's nominees likely will be essentially
similar to the last two Democratic appointees, Clinton appoin-
tees Breyer and Ginsburg (the only two Democrat-appointed
Justices in the past forty years, and therefore the only modem
data points)-though likely disagreeing as to one or another
specific points of law, as detailed in the below issue discus-
sions. If a Republican is elected in 2012, I similarly assume
that President would fulfill the identical campaign promise of
most recent Republican presidential nominees and primary
candidates: to appoint individuals like Justice Scalia and Tho-
mas.3
(2) Two Justices will retire during President Obama's first
term from among the two oldest (Stevens and Ginsburg) and
the one who, though younger, is reputed to have a personal de-
sire to leave the Court (Souter). It is possible all three will re-
tire, but to avoid exaggerating President Obama's ability to re-
shape the Court, I will assume that only Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg will depart during President Obama'sfirst term.
(3) Three of the next four oldest Justices (after Stevens and
Ginsburg)-Kennedy, Souter, Scalia, and Breyer-all four of
whom are close in age, will retire in President Obama's second
term, by the end of which their ages will range from 77 to 80.
I will assume that one of the four-Scalia-will delay retire-
ment to hold out for a later President of the same party (just as,
I suspect, Breyer would hold out during a Republican presi-
dency that starts in 2012).
Under this scenario, President Obama would appoint five Justices,
replacing the following:
2009-13 2013-17 (if Obama) 2013-17 (if Republican)
" Stevens * Souter - Souter
• Ginsburg -Kennedy -Kennedy
* Breyer * Scalia
3. Even moderate-leaning candidates for the Republican Presidential nomination, such as
Rudy Giuliani (who is pro-choice), have so promised.
2009]
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C. Can We Really Predict When Justices Will Retire-or How New Jus-
tices Will Vote?
Some may object that we never really know when Justices will re-
tire, or in particular that retirement is likely for a Justice at the height of
his powers as a "swing vote"-such as Justice Kennedy now, and for at
least several years to come. Yet the past few decades of Justice retire-
ments show a surprising degree of consistency in recent decades. There
have been eight retirements in the past thirty years:









Setting aside the youngest and oldest retirement ages in the last thir-
ty years,4 the retirement ages have ranged from 75 to 84. More notably,
there is a pattern in who has retired when: Justices who were considered
the "swing votes" of their time retire earlier, not later. Justice Kenne-
dy's predecessors as the Court's key swing votes all retired in their 60s
or 70s: Justices O'Connor (retired at 75), White (76), Powell (79), and
Stewart (66). The other four of the past eight retirees (Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist), far from being "swing votes," were
considered to be reliably on one "side" of the Court's major jurispruden-
tial schisms over individual rights, federal power, etc.-and all stayed on
the Court into their 80s. This may or may not be a permanent pattern,
but there is some evidence that the swing vote Justices retire at a more
normal retirement age (60s to 70s) than the Justices who see their service
on the Court as a "cause," whether jurisprudential or political, that moti-
vates them to remain on the Court about as long as their health allows.
Some also may object that Justices may not vote as Presidents want.
Conservatives express disappointment about certain non-"conservative"
individual rights and federal power rulings from three Republican ap-
pointees, Justices Souter, Kennedy, and Sandra Day O'Connor. Yet
these three Justices' appointments reflect odd political circumstances
4. Justice Stewart retired at age 66; Justice Stevens is still on the Court and thus has a re-
tirement age yet to be determined but known to be at least his current age of 88.
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unlikely to recur often: naming O'Connor fulfilled a campaign promise
by President Reagan to appoint a woman at a time (1981) when there
were relatively few prominent conservative female lawyers seasoned
enough to be plausible Justices; Souter was chosen despite lacking a
well-defined judicial ideology because he had powerful political patrons
(White House Chief of Staff John Sununu and Senator Warren Rudman)
from New Hampshire who were key to President Bush's 1988 victory in
the New Hampshire Republican primary election; and Justice Kennedy
was a backup, compromise nominee chosen only after two more original-
ist nominees (Judges Robert Bork and Douglas Ginsburg) failed in a
Senate in which President Reagan's party was a relatively small minori-
ty.
More importantly, unpredictable Justices have become more rare in
this era of professional, internet-facilitated background research and
pressure to appoint ideologically simpatico Justices. The 2005 nomi-
nation of Bush confidante Harriet Miers, an ideological question mark,
sparked the first conservative revolt against President Bush; and so far,
the four Justices appointed in the 1990s and 2000s have voted about as
expected.
II. THE ISSUES AT THE SUPREME COURT
Based on the recent history described above, we have good reason
to think that the Justices whom Presidents appoint are chosen for their
reliable track record on constitutional and other legal issues important to
that President (and to others in a position to offer the President input on
nominees, such as presidential advisors or key senators). If so, President
Obama's appointments will reshape the Court's rulings on a wide range
of currently controversial issues-but much more so in his second term
(if he wins one) than in his first term.
A. Abortion
A President committed to appointing Justices like Scalia and Tho-
mas (as virtually all recent Republican candidates for President have said
they are) would need only one Justice appointment to eliminate the con-
stitutional right to abortion first recognized by Roe v. Wade5 in 1973 and
then narrowed by Planned Parenthood v. Casey6 in 1992. Justices Scalia
and Thomas long have sought to eliminate constitutional abortion rights,
and they likely have the support of the two recent appointees, Justice
Alito and Chief Justice Roberts-leaving them one vote short of the five
necessary to overturn Roe. All of the next five likely retirees are suppor-
ters of decisions (a) protecting a constitutional right to abortion and (b)
refusing to overturn Roe. If any Republican similar to recent past Re-
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2009]
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publican nominees prevails in 2012, the Court very likely would have at
least six votes to overrule Roe.
In contrast, the first term of an Obama presidency simply will pre-
serve the status quo that the Constitution protects abortion rights; the
second term could see a return to the broader right to abortion that Roe
announced but that has been rolled back in recent years. Both of the
likely retirees during President Obama's first term-Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg-support the broad form of the right to abortion that Roe an-
nounced, so replacing them with even the strongest abortion rights sup-
porters would not change any votes at the Court. In a second term, Pres-
ident Obama could bring about a return to the stronger Roe-era abortion
rights of the 1970s and early 1980s by replacing two Justices: (1) most
importantly, Justice Kennedy, who, in 5-4 votes at the Supreme Court,
has voted (along with Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts) to allow
various abortion restrictions, including blanket bans on the procedure
alternately known as "partial birth" or "intact D&X" abortion;7 and (2)
secondarily, Justice Souter, who in Planned Parenthood v. Casey8 voted
to allow abortion-restricting, "informed consent" disclosures and "wait-
ing periods" for an abortion following an initial abortion consultation.
9
Even Obama appointees who disagree with the part of Planned Pa-
renthood v. Casey that allowed two abortion restrictions, however, might
not be willing to overturn those holdings for reasons of stare decisis.10
Thus in reproductive rights and other areas (such as the Establishment
Clause, below), the question will be whether Obama-appointed Justices
give priority to stare decisis or to restoring once-broader constitutional
rights.
B. The Establishment Clause
As with abortion, there likely already are four votes to lower the
wall of separation between church and state, such as precedents disallow-
ing school prayers at public school graduations. t Ever since the ap-
7. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1621 (2007).
8. 505 U.S. at 833.
9. Even if Justice Souter were to retire during President Obama's first rather than second
term, that would not change any Court outcomes; Justice Kennedy would remain the fifth vote to
allow various restrictions, like that on "partial birth" abortion, that neither Justice Souter nor his
replacement would allow.
10. For an opinion famously declaring that it was giving precedential value to a decision the
signatory Justices might not have otherwise supported, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at
871 ("We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the [Roe v. Wade] Court.
., would have concluded[] as the Roe Court did .... The matter is not before us in the first in-
stance, and, coming as it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are satisfied that
the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolution of the issue, but the precedential
force that must be accorded to its holding.").
11. See e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633 (1992) (Scalia J., dissenting) (supporting
public school graduation prayers, a position supported by Justice and Thomas supporting allowing
public school graduation prayers, a position likely supported by two more recent arrivals, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito).
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pointment of Justice Alito to replace Justice O'Connor, there likely al-
ready have been five votes to overturn certain decisions, such as those
disallowing governmental displays endorsing a particular religion.
12
More broadly, there already appear to be five Justices supporting the
"coercion" test (that religion in government is acceptable as long as it
does not coerce anyone) rather than the "endorsement" test (that religion
in government is acceptable as long as it does not endorse religion),
though the fifth "endorsement" vote is Justice Kennedy, whose more
lenient version of the test recognizes that certain ostensibly voluntary
religious endeavors are psychologically coercive, such as public school
graduation prayers.13
With Justices Stevens and Ginsburg two of the more staunchly se-
paration-of-church-and-state Justices, President Obama in his first term
would simply replace them with presumably like-minded Justices who
would retain current separation of church and state doctrine. A second
term for President Obama, in contrast, could make the wall of church-
state separation higher, reversing (for example) recent precedents allow-
ing some public funding of private religious education (because Justice
Kennedy was the fifth vote for those precedents)1 4 and some governmen-
tal displays of the Ten Commandments (because replacing Justices Ken-
nedy and Breyer, who voted to allow some such displays, could make
five votes to reverse, or at least not expand, those precedents).15
Were a Republican President to take office after the 2012 election,
most or all of his appointees, replacing Justices Souter, Kennedy, and
Breyer, likely would join Justices Thomas and Scalia, and probably Jus-
tice Alito, in overturning most of the body of case law disallowing public
school prayer, eliminating virtually all Court precedents requiring sepa-
ration of church and state, leaving only a rule that government cannot
coerce participation in government-sponsored prayers or other religious
rituals.16
C. Affirmative Action and School Desegregation
The Supreme Court may already have the votes to disallow all go-
vernmental affirmative action of the "individual racial preferences" va-
12. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (declaring that some, though not all, govern-
mental displays of the Ten Commandments are permissible-but Justice O'Connor, who voted to
disallow some such displays, has since been replaced by Justice Alito).
13. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93.
14. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (allowing public funds for secular portions
of teaching at parochial schools, thus overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
15. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681-82 (allowing government Ten Commandments display where
public officials asserted it was part of a broader display of ancient laws).
16. Under this scenario, the Supreme Court's ruling disallowing mandatory public school
prayer in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962), would remain, but a public school prayer from
which students could opt out would be permissible, contrary to Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (disallowing
voluntary prayer at public school graduation), and Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
320 (2000) (disallowing voluntary prayer at high school football game), and other cases.
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riety, or at least to disallow far more than it has in past decisions. The
Court permitted some but not all affirmative action in higher education in
a close vote (5-4) in 2003,17 but that was before Justice Alito (who in a
recent desegregation case signaled opposition to any consideration of
race 18) replaced Justice O'Connor (who had sided with allowing affirma-
tive action at the University of Michigan Law School' 9). Justice Kenne-
dy now is the only potential fifth vote to allow any individual-preference
affirmative action, but he voted in 2003 against both University of Mich-
igan programs before the Court,20 and in 2007 against both public school
desegregation programs before the Court; 21 in the latter case, Justice
Kennedy expressed negative sentiments about the very concept of re-
medial racial preferences.22
An Obama presidency likely would preserve the largely anti-
affirmative action Court status quo in his first term-replacing Justice
Stevens and Ginsburg with like-minded pro-affirmative action Justices,
leaving a total of only four votes in favor of allowing most affirmative
action. As with abortion, President Obama probably could change the
law only in his second term, by replacing Justice Kennedy, the key fifth
vote to eliminate much affirmative action.
D. Limits on Federal "Commerce" Legislation: Employment Discrimi-
nation and Abortion
The Court in 1995 and 2000 announced, for the first time since the
1930s, limits on Congress's power to use its legislative power over "In-
terstate Commerce" to enact laws on noncommercial matters such as gun
possession and bias-motivated violence.23 The Court has since declined
to limit Congress's Commerce power further, issuing decisions allowing
federal restrictions on marijuana grown for personal medicinal use24 and
on state auto accident litigation.25
17. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-75 (2003) (disallowing affirmative action in Uni-
versity of Michigan undergraduate admissions because the school used a too-rigid and too-
substantial award of "points" based on race); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (allowing
affirmative action in University of Michigan Law School admissions because the school did not use
a point system and appeared to consider race only as one of many diversity-related and subjective
factors).
18. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007).
19. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
20. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
21. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
22. Id. at 2795-97. Justice Kennedy declined to join the four-Justice plurality declaring any
use of race impermissible; Justice Kennedy instead opined that some race-based desegregation
tactics, e.g., redrawing school district lines to increase racial balance, might be acceptable, but only
so long as they did not involve assigning individuals based on their race. d. at 2791-92.
23. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 551 (1995).
24. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
25. Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147-48 (2003).
[Vol. 86.S1
THE COURTS UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA
The leading voice on the Court for narrowing the Commerce power,
Justice Thomas, so far has not won much support on the Court for his
view that Congress has used the Commerce clause to enact far too much
noncommercial legislation. The 1930s Supreme Court cases first allow-
ing Congress to pass federal laws on all commercial activities with "sub-
stantial effects" on interstate commerce (including working conditions,
consumer protection, and monopolization) were, in Justice Thomas's
view, a "wrong turn" from earlier case law disallowing any federal laws
about activities, such as manufacturing, working conditions, or product
quality, that occurred within one state despite their interstate effects.26
Under this narrow view of the federal commerce power, which prevailed
at the Court from the late nineteenth century until the mid-1930s, all fed-
eral employment discrimination, union rights, and minimum/overtime
wage laws were impermissible exercises of federal power, to be struck
down by the Court-cases that Justice Thomas has cited with approval.27
Justice Thomas may or may not have support from Justice Alito and
Chief Justice Roberts, who have not opined on this issue as Justices but
did, as lower-court judges, hold that federal laws banning machine guns28
and protecting a locally endangered species,29 respectively, were imper-
missible expansions of the interstate commerce power.
As with several of the areas of law discussed so far, the first term of
an Obama presidency would ossify the status quo, and the second term
could slightly roll back, or at least limit the reach of, some of the Court's
recent jurisprudence. Four of the five Justices President Obama is likely
to replace (all but Justice Kennedy) voted against the Commerce Clause
limits the Court announced in 1995 and 2000, and with the Court majori-
ties rejecting all the Commerce Clause challenges the Court has faced
since 2000; only two Justices among those four seem likely candidates to
retire in President Obama's first term. Were President Obama to win a
second term, replacing Justice Kennedy would give a potential fifth vote
26. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[F]rom the
time of the ratification of the Constitution to the mid 1930's, it was widely understood that the
Constitution granted Congress only limited powers . . . . If anything, the 'wrong turn' was the
Court's dramatic departure in the 1930's from a century and a half of precedent.") (citing with ap-
proval United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) (limiting federal antitrust law, hold-
ing that Congress's interstate commerce power did not reach the manufacturing of products trans-
ported interstate, because the manufacturing itself was within one state) (other citations omitted).
27. Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 599, cited Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 308 (1936) (disallowing federal law regulating mine labor because "[tihe relation of
employer and employee is a local relation.") and A. L A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 543-50 (1935) (disallowing federal law regulating intrastate sale of sick chickens, or
the labor of employees involved in intrastate chicken sales, on same rationale).
28. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the federal ban on possessing machine guns exceeded Congress's power under the interstate
commerce clause).
29. Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dis-
senting) (suggesting he agreed that it is unconstitutional for the federal government to regulate
environmental matters--there, protection of an endangered species-that are noncommercial and
solely within one state).
20091
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to the bloc of Justices that never have supported any of the Court's deci-
sions imposing limits on the Commerce power.
If a Republican takes office in 2012, he or she would have a chance
to strengthen limits on the Commerce power, perhaps substantially
enough for Justice Thomas's narrower view of federal power to prevail.
There now may be two or three votes for the Thomas view: Justice Scalia
has not advocated as narrow a view of federal power,30 but both of the
new Justices, Alito and Roberts, supported narrowing the Commerce
power as appellate judges and may support Thomas's view as members
of the Court. A Republican President could replace three Justices who
have disagreed with Justice Thomas; were two or more of the three new
Justices to support the Thomas view, that would yield a majority. If the
Thomas view becomes a majority position on the Court, all federal labor
and employment laws likely would be struck down, leaving it legal to
discriminate, pay less than the minimum wage, and crack down on un-
ions, at least in the many states lacking their own state-specific labor and
employment laws.
Interestingly, however, while a Court narrowing the Commerce
power would likely be a Court that overturns the constitutional right to
abortion (because the same Republican nominees would tend to do both),
the Commerce narrowing likely would disallow any federal restrictions
on abortion. The narrow Commerce view often is depicted mainly as a
threat to progressive legislation--environmental, discrimination, gun
control, etc.-but it also could disallow federal laws restricting individu-
al health-related decisions, such as the right to use medical marijuana or
to have an abortion. Though a staunch critic of Roe, Justice Thomas has
hinted that he questions Congress's power to pass federal abortion laws
such as the ban on "partial birth" abortion. 31 His view, which may seem
idiosyncratic politically but which is perfectly consistent with his judicial
philosophy of interpreting the Constitution based on original intent, ap-
pears to be that there is no individual constitutional right to abortion but
also no federal power to ban abortion either; abortion is a matter the
states, but not the federal government, can regulate. So there seem al-
ready to be five or six votes on the Court to strike down federal abortion
30. In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 34, Justice Thomas and two others voted to disallow a
federal ban on state authorization of medical marijuana; Justice Scalia voted to allow the federal ban
because the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause justifies federal regulation of intrastate
commerce of a commodity (there, locally grown marijuana) as necessary to effectuate a federal ban
in interstate commerce in the commodity.
31. In Gonzalez v. Carhart, Justice Thomas joined the majority allowing the federal ban but
wrote a four-sentence concurrence, the latter half of which read: "I also note that whether the Act
constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause is not before the
Court. The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is outside the question presented; and the lower
courts did not address it." 550 U.S. at 1639-40. In light of Justice Thomas's earlier elaboration of
his view that Congress's commerce power should be restricted substantially, it seems clear his con-
currence was explaining that it was because of the limited procedural posture of the appeal that he
was upholding the federal ban despite his "commerce" qualms.
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laws, just for different reasons: the four Justices supporting abortion
rights; Justice Thomas in opposition to Congressional power over non-
commercial matters like abortion, possibly joined by Justice Alito or
Chief Justice Roberts or both. Ironically, the Republican appointees
most likely to bring about the demise of Roe are most likely to take a
narrow view of federal power that would disallow federal abortion bans,
leaving abortion battles to be fought individually in each of the states.
E. Presidential Power
Like federal abortion laws, presidential power is an area where
ideological lines blur, with small-government conservatives (like Justice
Scalia) taking polar opposite positions from conservatives who believe in
theories such as a "unitary executive" branch led by a President with
broad powers (like Justices Thomas and Alito). This is why ideological
lines blur so badly in some of the most politically charged cases the
Court has heard during both the Bush and Clinton presidencies. In
2004's Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,32 one of the key "war on terror" cases, Justic-
es Scalia and Stevens, who rarely agree on contested individual rights
issues, jointly argued against any presidential power to detain American
citizens captured abroad without trial as "unlawful combatants"; Justice
Thomas argued the opposite, for allowing the broad executive power
President Bush sought. The Court's middle-ground ultimate ruling in
Hamdi, requiring fair military tribunals but not full public trials for the
alleged unlawful combatants, was issued by three Justices of vastly dif-
ferent perspectives: Chief Justice Rehnquist (a Nixon appointee who had
advocated broad presidential national security power as a 1960s White
House lawyer); Justice O'Connor (a Reagan appointee who became the
Court's "swing vote," a pro-states' rights conservative who also joined
some decisions broadening individual rights); and Justice Breyer (a Clin-
ton appointee who votes for broad individual rights but also espouses a
pragmatic view of the need for government power and discretion).
Perhaps illustrating how most Presidents tend to push the bounds of
executive power regardless of their ideology, President Clinton suffered
a loss before a similarly ideologically muddled Supreme Court. In
1998's Clinton v. City of New York, 3 3 some of the Court's leading liber-
als (Justices Stevens and Ginsburg) joined conservatives (Justices Rehn-
quist and Thomas) to disallow the line-item veto as an impermissible
expansion of presidential power.
The presidential power cases show how not all issues the Court
handles are predictable, and not all fall neatly along the left-versus-right
lines that dominate the political debate. After all, President Bush's three
Court nominees-Roberts, Alito, and the ill-fated Harriet Miers-had
32. 542 U.S. 507, 550, 579 (2004).
33. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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little in common but the fact that all three had worked as executive
branch lawyers for Presidents seeking to expand presidential power,
clearly a key issue for President Bush. With Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito replacing two of the Justices who voted to limit President
Bush's war-on-terror powers in Hamdi, the Bush Justices may well al-
ready have expanded presidential power. Yet that presidential power
will not be limited to Republican Presidents; as Comedy Central's Jon
Stewart asked former top Bush White House lawyer Jack Goldsmith of
the administration's efforts to expand presidential power, "Do you think
the ultimate irony might be that all the work that Dick Cheney has done
will make Hillary Clinton the most powerful president in the history of
the United States?" (Goldsmith smiled, nodded, and said "possibly").34
With presidential power a double-edged sword-or at least a sword
that both you and your enemies alike get turns using-it is far from clear
that a President Obama Justice would vote to restrict presidential power;
it is just too unclear whether "original intent" theory, "living Constitu-
tion" theory, conservatism, or liberalism support expanding or narrowing
presidential power. So not all Court rulings can be predicted from the
name and party of the President appointing the next Justices. But you
already knew that.
1mI. THE APPELLATE AND DISTRICT COURTS
The impact of judicial nominations is even harder to predict at the
district and appellate level than at the Supreme Court level, for several
reasons. First, these courts have nondiscretionary dockets, making it
harder for judges to select areas of law to rule upon and change. Second,
and relatedly, non-ideological cases are more common, such as garden-
variety contract or tort cases in federal courts on diversity jurisdiction but
presenting no novel questions of law. Third, even some cases in ideolog-
ically charged fields simply are very weak cases destined to lose on dis-
positive motions before almost any judge. Fourth, with almost a thou-
sand judges issuing thousands of decisions annually, it is harder to find a
pattern, or to cite a handful of decisions as indicating anything significant
about the courts' direction. Fifth, with in-state recommendations or no-
minating commissions playing a prominent role in Presidents' selection
processes, it is harder to profile nominees by President.
Still, there are two points worth noting about the possible direction
of the courts after President Obama has an opportunity to fill an appreci-
able number of district and appellate vacancies. First, certain areas of
34. The basic point remains valid, of course, even though Senator Clinton was not elected
President in 2008, as seemed possible at the time of this October 2007 interview. The Daily Show
with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast October 4, 2007), available at
http:llwww.thedailyshow.comlvideo/index.jhtml?videold= 109135&title=jack-goldsmith.
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law have seen dramatic change that could be reversed or slowed with a
new crop of judges. For example:
- Some judges express outright hostility to employment dis-
crimination cases, actually mocking plaintiffs' claims of dis-
crimination, in fairly unprofessional terms, in decisions dis-
missing such claims.
35
* Other judges write judicial decisions gratuitously expressing
hostilit y to entire remedial statutes providing federal causes of
action.
- Just this decade, the Supreme Court has issued a series of
"9-0 decisions reversing too-restrictive circuit holdings on the
fundamental question of what constitutes sufficient evidence of
discrimination" 37-- overturning the views of the Second,
38
Fifth 39 Sixth,4 Ninth,41 and Eleventh4 2 Circuits (and other cir-
cuits with case law similar to that the Court reversed, such as
the First43 and Eighth" Circuits).
35. See, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1351 (2d Cir. 1997) (Jacobs, J., con-
curring) (using literary reference to mock the idea of discrimination based on an intersection of two
or more classes-specifically, plaintiff's claim, and the lower court finding, of discrimination on the
basis of Dr. Fisher's status as a married woman: "'How fascinating is that class / Whose only mem-
ber is Me!' W.H. Auden, 'Islands,' 24, The Shield of Achilles (1955)."); Rosa v. Brink's Inc., 103 F.
Supp. 2d 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Rakoff, J.) (mocking the idea that a bigoted individual could be
biased against several groups, beginning a judicial opinion dismissing an employment discrimination
claim as follows: "Move over, Archie Bunker. According to the plaintiff here, defendant Brink's
Inc. and three of its executives are so steeped in prejudice that they intentionally discriminated
against her on grounds of race, national origin, gender, age, and disability--all at once.").
36. See, e.g., Phillips v. The Pepsi Bottling Group, No. 05-cv-01322, 2007 WL 3378544, at
*1 (D. Colo. 2007) (Nov. 13, 2007) (denying motion for recusal made after, plaintiff claimed, a
Magistrate Judge said: "The biggest problem with your case is that Judge Nottingham hates em-
ployment cases and there's nothing you can do about [it] .... [Hie will try to find anything in the
summary judgment briefs to say there's no material issues and grant summary judgment, and if he
doesn't, he will make it tough at trial, and you won't win."); Phillip v. ANR Freight Systems, Inc.,
945 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of recusal made after District Judge Dean
Whipple said, in ruling on an evidentiary dispute: "I am not going to let them in, unproven allega-
tions. Just because lawsuits are filed doesn't give credibility to them, especially in these cases.
Those are Title VII cases. Congress has created a nightmare because they entice anybody and eve-
rybody to file those things and entice any attorney to file them in the mere chance that if they win a
dollar they can win attorney fees. So I think any Title VII cases ought to be looked at with suspicion
to begin with because it's a crap shoot, which everybody engages in.").
37. Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Su-
preme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 981, 1001 (2007).
38. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
39. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-49 (2000).
40. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2407 (2006).
41. Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 90 (2003).
42. Ash v. Tyson Foods, 546 U.S. 454,456-57 (2006).
43. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 133, not only reversed the Fifth Circuit's view, but also abrogated the
First Circuit's (and others') view, that as a matter of law a discrimination plaintiff could not prevail
by proving the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory motivation pretextual. See Woods v. Friction
Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255 (1st Cir. 1994).
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Judicial nominees of President Obama, the first President to have been an
attorney representing plaintiffs in discrimination cases, may prove less
hostile to this area of law, which constitutes a sizeable share of the feder-
al docket.
45
Second, even if outcomes of an "Obama Judiciary" are hard to
guess, the profile of the typical Obama nominee might be different from
that of the typical Clinton or Bush nominee. Setting aside ideology,
Clinton- and Bush-appointed judges had remarkably similar profiles in
terms of gender, race, age, and professional background, as illustrated by
the table below. Tables 1 and 2, below, tabulate statistics for all district
and appellate judges appointed by either of the past two Presidents.
46
TABLE 1
Clinton/Bus h DistrictlAppellate Nominees - Demographics
Female Nonwhite Age
Pros. Total
# % # % 30s 40s 50s 60s A M.
Clinton-All 361 100 28% 88 24% 7 171 152 31 50
Clnton-Disrict 295 81 27% 71 24% 7 145 121 22 50
Cinton-Appelate 66 19 29% 18 27% 0 26 31 9 52
Bush-All 322 71 22/ 56 17% 12 124 163 23 50
Bush-Disrit 262 54 21% 49 19% 10 103 130 19 50
Bush-Appelate 60 17 28% 7 12% 2 21 33 4 51
Total Cinton/Bush 683 171 25% 144 21% 19 295 315 54 50
44. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway, 548 U.S. at 53, not only reversed the Sixth Cir-
cuit's view, but also abrogated the Eighth Circuit's (and others') view, of what constituted actionable
retaliation by employers. See Spears v. Missouri Dep't of Corr. & Human Resources, 210 F.3d 850
(8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a retaliatory lateral transfer with no loss in pay was not actionable).
45. Labor and employment litigation (of which discrimination is the most prominent compo-
nent) constitutes twelve to fourteen percent of the federal docket. Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and
the Transformation of American Labor Unions, 69 Mo. L. REv. 365, 369 n.27 (2004).
46. All of the raw data underlying these tables is on file with the author. Following are two
brief clarifications of the professional background information in Table 2: (1) each column indicates
whether the individual ever held that type of job, whether or not that job immediately preceded the
federal judicial nomination; and (2) the "Prosecutor or other Gov't Atty" category includes work as a
prosecutor or as any other kind of government attorney actually practicing law (or supervising a
department of practicing attorneys), but not government jobs such as legislator or legislative staffer,
judge or other judiciary employee, public defender (which is captured in a separate column), patent
examiner, etc.
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TAB LE 2
Clinton/Bush District/Appellate Nominees - Professional Background
Elected Prosecutoror Public Private
Pres. Total Office other Gov't Atty Defender Practice
_ _ _ # % # % # % # %
Clinton-All 361 13 4% 206 57% 42 12% 318 88%
Clinton-District 295 9 3% 164 56% 40 14% 262 89%
Clinton-Appelate 66 4 6% 42 64% 2 3% 56 85%
Bush-All 322 14 4% 171 53% 16 5% 283 88%
Bush-District 262 9 3% 140 53% 14 5% 229 87%
Bush-Appellate 60 5 8% 31 52% 2 3% 54 90%
Total Clinton/Bush 683 27 4% 377 55% 58 8% 601 880
While the decisions and judicial philosophies of each President's
judges may vary, the professional profiles of Clinton and Bush nominees
seem strikingly similar:
" The vast majority of nominees had private practice experience, a
bit over half had worked as prosecutors or as another kind of
government attorney, and only small fractions were elected offi-
cials or public defenders.
" One-quarter were female, one-fifth were nonwhite, and for both
presidents the average age identically was 50 (ranging from 35 to
69).
There are, however, a few differences, between the two Presidents'
picks:
" Even though the pool of attorneys has become more diverse over
time, and Bush nominees were in a later (and thus more diverse)
eight-year period than Clinton's, the Bush nominees (22% fe-
male, 17% nonwhite) were a bit less diverse than Clinton's (28%
female, 24% nonwhite).
" Despite overall similar professional profiles, more Clinton than
Bush nominees were public defenders (12% versus 5%) and
prosecutors or government attorneys (57% versus 53%), even
though the same percentage were in private practice (88 %)-
which indicates that the Clinton picks were not more likely to
choose public service instead of private practice, but instead more
likely to have both private practice and public service experience.
As of this writing, before President Obama has chosen any judicial
nominees, it remains to be seen (a) whether the overall Bush-Clinton
similarity indicates that the same basic population of lawyers gets ap-
pointed no matter who is President, (b) whether the few Bush-Clinton
differences indicate that Obama nominees will be more like President
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Clinton's than President Bush's, or (c) whether President Obama may
choose more outside-the-box judicial nominees differing in professional
profile, demographics, or both, from those of the prior two Presidents.
